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CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-CoURTS-MARTIAL-PowER OF CoNGRESs To PRO-
VIDE FOR MILITARY JURISDICTION OVER RETIRED SERVICEMEN-A retired naval 
officer was charged with violations of the Uniform Code of Military Jus-
tice1 based upon acts of sodomy occurring after his retirement.2 At arraign-
ment he challenged the jurisdiction of the military tribunal on the ground 
that Article 2(4) of the U.C.M.J.,3 providing for court-martial jurisdiction 
over retired servicemen, contravenes the Fifth Amendment.4 The court-
martial and the board of review overruled this objection, and the accused 
was convicted and sentenced.5 On appeal, held, while jurisdiction is proper, 
reversed on other grounds for further proceedings. A retired member of 
the armed forces who is entitled to pay is a part of "the land or naval 
forces" and is therefore subject to military jurisdiction within the exception 
to the Fifth Amendment. United States v. Hooper, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 637 (1958). 
Congress may provide for military jurisdiction pursuant to the exercise 
of its power "To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the 
1 Articles 125, 133 and 134 of the U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1958) §§925, 933, 934. 
Art. 125 defines and prescribes the punishment for sodomy, Art. 133 the punishment for 
conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, and Art. 134 the punishment for conduct 
of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces. 
2Accused was transferred to the Regular Navy retired list in 1948 after 20 years 
active service with the rank of Rear-Admiral but with retired pay based on his former 
rank of Captain in accordance with 60 Stat. 27 (1946), 34 U.S.C. (1952) §410b, and 61 
Stat. 874 (1947), 34 U.S.C. (1952) §410n. 
3 "The following persons are subject to this chapter: . . . (4) Retired members of 
a regular component of the armed forces who are entitled to pay .... " 10 U.S.C. (Supp. 
V, 1958) §802. 
4 "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or othenvise infamous crime, 
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the 
land or naval forces . ••. " U.S. CONST., Amend. V. Emphasis supplied. 
5 The sentence of dismissal included forfeiture of retirement benefits. 
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land and naval Forces."6 It had generally been assumed that this power was 
limited by the Fifth Amendment to "cases arising in" the land or naval 
forces.7 Since 1955, however, a majority of the Supreme Court has cast doubt 
upon this assumption.8 This majority, speaking through Justice Black, ex-
pressed the view that the power to govern the armed- forces is not limited 
by the Fifth Amendment, because that amendment exc~pts from its opera-
tion the Article I power.9 Despite the general judicial practice of liberally 
construing Article I powers which do not come in conflict with the Bill of 
Rights, the majority construed the Article I power to be limited to "persons 
in" the armed forces. This strict construction was justified on the ground 
that otherwise the power would deprive individuals of constitutional rights 
which would be afforded them under alternative modes of prosecution.10 
Justice Harlan, however, has insisted upon the earlier view which likewise 
justifies a strict construction, but on the significantly different ground that 
the exception to the Fifth Amendment limits the power without reference 
to preferable alternatives.11 Despite this basic difference in approach, the 
proponents of both views utilized essentially the same substantive tests in 
examining the appropriateness of court-martial jurisdiction. Of foremost 
6 U.S. CONST., Art. I, §8, cl. 14. See, e.g., Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. (61 U.S.) 65 
(1858); Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13 at 21 (1879). 
7 Although the Supreme Court :had not yet passed definitively on the question of what 
is the proper relationship in this connection between the Art. I power and the Fifth 
Amendment, lower courts had agreed that the Fifth Amendment operated directly upon 
the Art. I power by way of limitation. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Flannery v. Com-
manding General, (S.D. N.'Y. 1946) 69 F. Supp. 661; Terry v. United States, (W.D. Wash. 
1933) 2 F. Supp. 962; In re Bogart, (C.C. Cal. 1873) 3 Fed. Cas. 796, No. 1,596. This was 
the view adopted by the court in the principal case, at 642 et seq. 
8See United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955) (denying military 
jurisdiction over an ex-serviceman for crimes alleged to have been committed while the 
accused was still in service), and Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. I (1957) (denying military 
jurisdiction over civilians living with servicemen on a military base). 
o This construction is supported by the similarity between language found in Art. I, 
§8, cl. 14, and that in the exception phrase of the Fifth Amendment. For a prior indica-
tion of this construction, see Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487 at 500 (1885). 
10 E.g., the right to grand jury indictment and trial by jury in federal criminal 
proceedings. 
11 See his concurring opinion in Reid v. Covert, note 8 supra, at 65. As to the 
interpretation of the words "cases arising in" contained in the Fifth Amendment there 
is a split of authority, some courts construing these words to mean "events arising in" 
and other courts construing them to mean "persons in" the armed forces. Compare 
Terry v. United States, note 7 supra; In re Bogart, note 7 supra, with the principal 
case at 642 et seq.; United States ex rel. Flannery v. Commanding General, note 7 supra. 
See WINTHROP, MILITARY LAw AND PRECEDENTS, 2d ed., 106 (1920). The latter interpreta-
tion would be somewhat strained in the setting of numerous decisions which have 
upheld, in special circuinstances, military jurisdiction over civilians. E.g., Madsen v. 
Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); Perlstein v. United 
States, (M.D. Pa. 1944) 57 F. Supp. 123; McCune v. Kilpatrick, (E.D. Va. 1943) 53 F. Supp. 
80. The former interpretation, while recognizing the importance of the relationship 
of the accused to the armed forces, permits a more flexible consideration of the effect 
of the crime upon the proper functioning of the military. 
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importance in this examination were the relationship of the accused to 
the armed forces, and, to a lesser extent, the effect of the crime upon the 
proper functioning of the military. When these substantive tests are applied 
to the exercise of military jurisdiction over retired officers, a contrary con-
clusion to that reached in the instant case is indicated. The relationship 
of a retired officer to the armed forces is perfunctory. The principal argu-
• ment made in support of his amenability to court-martial is based upon 
the sizable retirement pay to which he is entitled.12 In so far as this argu-
ment suggests a contractual basis, it suffices to say that such jurisdiction 
goes to the subject matter13 and therefore cannot be conferred by consent.14 
Even if the contractual argument were otherwise permissible, it would seem 
that retirement pay is.a substantial inducement to enlistment for a military 
career, and is thus in the nature of a deferred compensation or pension. In 
addition, if a retired officer is amenable to military jurisdiction, it would 
mean that one who enlists with a view toward a career in the armed forces 
surrenders his right to civil trial for the rest of his life unless he resorts to 
the undesirable alternative of resignation and the accompanying abandon-
ment of retirement benefits; such terms of service would seem onerous 
indeed. Furthermore, a retired officer may not be recalled to active duty 
without his consent except in time of war or national emergency,15 and 
therefore is further removed from actual military service than the average 
civilian.16 It is difficult, also, to sustain this jurisdiction on the ground that 
it is essential to the proper functioning of the military. Although crimes by 
retired officers are likely to have some effect upon the discipline and morale 
of the active troops, this effect is probably less, than that produced by the 
denial of military jurisdiction over discharged servicemen for crimes com-
mitted while still in the active service.17 It seems, also, that jurisdiction over 
civilian dependents or employees living in military camps abroad18 is more 
12 See principal case at 645. Retirement pay may be as high as 75% of the pay to 
which the officer would have been entitled if he had continued in active service in the 
grade at which he was retired. IO U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1958) §1401. 
13 VerMehren v. Sirmyer, (8th Cir. 1929) 36 F. (2d) 876. 
14 Mcclaughry v. Deming, 186 U.S. 49 at 66 (1902). 
15 IO U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1958) §672. 
16 Many draft-eligible men may be called to active duty without their consent at 
any time. In addition, members of the Ready Reserve and Standby Reserve, who are not 
generally subject to court-martial, must be called ,before the members of the Retired 
Reserve in case of war or national emergency. IO U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1958) §672(a). 
17 United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, note 8 supra. 
18 See Reid v. Covert, note 8 supra, denying such jurisdiction over civilian dependents 
at least in capital cases, and United States ex rel. Guagliardo v. McElroy, (D.C. Cir. 1958) 
259 F. (2d) 927, cert. granted 27 U.S. LAW WEEK 3231 (1959), denying military jurisdiction, 
in a non-capital case, over a civilian employee attached to the armed forces. But compare 
Grisham v. Taylor, (3d Cir. 1958) 261 F. (2d) 204, and United States ex rel. Wilson v. 
Bohlander, (D.C. Colo. 1958) 167 F. Supp. 791, •both allowing military jurisdiction over 
civilian employees serving with the armed forces overseas. The Grisham case involved a 
capital offense while the Wilson case involved lesser offenses. 
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intimately connected with the proper functioning of the military than is jur-
isdiction over retired officers leading a private life in the United States. In 
addition, the offense of sodomy goes less to the core of military discipline 
than does, for example, insubordination;19 while offenses like insubordina-
tion are solely punishable by the military, sodomy is cognizable in civil 
courts.20 
It would seem that the proponents of both views would favor a strict 
construction of the Article I power in the principal case. Application of the 
Black view, however, presents a special problem. Justice Black would con-
sider the safeguards guaranteed by the Constitution if alternative modes 
of prosecution were followed.21 In the principal case, the existing alterna-
tive to military jurisdiction is jurisdiction by the state in which the offense 
was committed.22 While Justices Black and Douglas have taken the position 
that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments in their entirety restrain state as 
well as federal action,23 the other justices have not. For them, the argument 
that these safeguards would be available in the alternative mode of prose-
cution could not be made.24 They would then be faced with the desire 
strictly to construe the Article I power but seemingly without an established 
basis for doing so. 
Stephen B. Flood 
19 Cf. Closson v. United States ex rel. Armes, (D.C. Cir. 1896) 7 App. D.C. 460. 
20 Justices Frankfurter and Harlan, concurring separately in the Reid case, note 
8 supra, limited their opinions to capital cases and might be willing to distinguish, in 
certain circumstances, between crimes which may and may not .be tried by court-martial. 
Perhaps the line could be drawn between crimes which are punishable solely by the 
military and those which are cognizable in federal or state courts. The President has 
authority to strike retired officers from the rolls for convictions in state or federal courts. 
10 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1958) §1163b(2). Thus, the punishment prescribed in the principal 
case could be accomplished in this manner without subjecting retired officers in future 
cases to the possibility of more serious punishment ,without the benefit of a non-military 
trial. 
21 The degree of reliance which is placed on the constitutional alternatives argument 
is especially well illustrated ·by the Reid case, note 8 supra, where the impracticality 
of providing any other mode of punishment would seem otherwise to have led to the 
conclusion that court-martial jurisdiction was necessary to the proper functioning of the 
military. See Reid v. Covert, note 8 supra, at 76, n. 12. 
22 It is conceivable that Congress could constitutionally provide for the trial of 
retired officers in federal courts, but it would seem that somewhat the same considerations 
which militate against the power of Congress to provide for military jurisdiction would 
prevent its providing for federal court jurisdiction. If the federal jurisdiction were made 
exclusive, it would be open to the additional objection that it encroaches upon state 
power to define and punish crimes. 
23 See their dissenting opinion in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 at 68 et seq. 
(1947). See also Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 at 177 et seq. (1952). 
24 It is possible that the Black view might be construed as resting upon a broader 
basis of any preferable alternatives, whether constitutional or otherwise. It could be 
argued that state trial is a preferable alternative to court-martial jurisdiction because 
of the fact that the states characteristically ensure greater safeguards than does the 
military. However, this argument is open to the objection that this preferable procedure 
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is subject to change. Justice Black observed in response -to the argument that military 
justice has undergone substantial reforms, "Moreover the reforms are merely statutory; 
Congress and perhaps •the President can reinstate former practices, subject to any limita-
tions imposed by the Constitution, whenever it desires." \Reid v. Covert, note 8 supra, at 
37. T:his would also seem to be true of <the states. 
